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INTRODUCTION
Business entities indulge in market and product diversification with the intention of sales expansion, risk management, and profit maximization. Strategic management theory suggests that diversification should have positive impact on performance due to economies of scope and scale, market power effects, risk reduction effects, and learning effects (Geringer et al. 2000) . If the diversification has a narrow focus and is across connected constituencies (related diversification), it can have positive effect on performance since the different market and product areas can leverage knowledge gained in each other (Rumelt 1974) . However, if the diversification is too wide (unrelated diversification), it can have negative impact on performance due to lack of economies of scope in developing competencies (Palepu 1985) .
Extant research (Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Francis et al. 2012) suggests that audit quality is an increasing function of audit office size. Moreover, audit office revenue (size) may be a function of diversification and audit quality may be a function of diversification.
However, no prior study examines the impact of audit office diversification on audit quality 1 .
This paper tries to fill this gap by examining the consequences of diversification by the audit office on its performance. The audit offices can diversify in various ways. They can audit clients in multiple industries; audit a wide variety of clients within an industry; audit clients located in diverse locations; or provide multiple services, other than auditing, to the same client, such as, tax compliance and planning, auditing employee benefit plans, acquisition related consultancy services, internal-control reviews, and attest services. Thus, the research question addressed in this paper is: Does diversification at the audit office level lead to economies of scope, scale, and 4 experience, thereby, providing higher audit quality; or does diversification strain available resources at the audit office level resulting in lower audit quality?
Over nineteen-thousand client-year observations pertaining to 3,320 clients for the period 2000-2009 are analyzed and the impact of various diversification measures on two proxies of audit quality, mainly levels of discretionary accruals and propensity to meet or beat earnings expectations by a cent are examined. The findings support the conclusion that diversification across industries, across clients within industries, and across clients dispersed geographically amounts to unrelated diversification that is detrimental to the audit quality of the audit office.
One explanation of this result is that such diversification lacks focus and fails to create synergy and does not transfer competencies between various constituencies. On the other hand, diversification of types of services offered to the same client is a related diversification that leads to economies of scope and learning and results in improved audit quality at the audit office level.
Pecking order of the various diversification strategies is also examined. Finally, the paper tests for impact of changes in diversification levels and role of audit office reputation on audit quality.
These findings add to the recent research stream that examines micro-factors at the audit office level and their impact on audit quality. The results will also help future researchers in refining their models that examine the impact of audit office attributes on audit quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the theoretical framework and presents the hypotheses. Next, the research design is explained in Section III, followed by a discussion of the sample in Section IV and the results in Section V. Concluding comments in are offered in Section VI.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Diversification by business entities has been a common practice over time (Rumelt 1974; Hitt et al. 1994; Hitt et al. 1997 ). According to Palepu (1985) , diversification strategy of a business entity is an important part of strategic management, and the impact of diversification strategy on the performance of the business entity is an issue of considerable interest to both academics and managers. Typically, the entity's diversification strategy is positively associated with its performance (Christensen and Montgomery 1981; Montgomery 1982; Rumelt 1982) .
Diversification can lead to sales expansion (Etgar and Rachman-Moore 2010) , and according to Porter (1976) , sales volume and relative market shares are major determinants of firms' relative power in the market allowing the firm to extract rent from more customers. Teece (1982) , Barney (1991) , Mahoney and Pandian (1992) , Peteraf (1993), Teece et al. (1997) use the resource-based theory of the firm to argue that economies of scope and economic quasi-rent from shared strategic capabilities help generate sustainable competitive advantages and better performance.
According to Greenwood et al. (2005) , multidisciplinary practice (MDP) in accounting has four competitive benefits. First, it offers clients the convenience of dealing with a single supplier, which the Big-N accounting firms claimed as an important justification for their provision of consulting services. Second, economies of scope arise from delivering several services through the same distribution channels. Third, firms can "cross sell" services, taking advantage of relationships with clients to offer additional services. Clients, confronted with uncertainty over the capabilities of alternative suppliers, transfer their assessment of a firm's capabilities from one service to another (Nayyar, 1993) . Fourth, diversification helps retain highly skilled personnel because the firm can offer complex assignments and provide scope for growth. Arrunada (1999) argues that a diversified client base leads to independence. In other 6 words, spreading quasi-rents across a large number of clients makes the auditor more dependent on all the clients and less dependent on any one client, thereby reducing chances of any leniency towards a single client. According to him, the structure of the audit firm, human capital, and the existing client relationship can be utilized more efficiently through diversification. Knowledge can be shared and transferred among employees performing overlapping tasks leading to a more efficient and comprehensive performance leading to better judgment resulting in better audit quality. On the other hand, Gort (1962) , Arnould (1969), and Markham (1973) do not find a significant association between performance and the level of diversification.
Finance literature provides some evidence that the value of diversified firm is less than the sum of its parts (Jensen 1986; Berg and Ofek 1995) . Several studies in strategic management literature provide evidence of an inverted U curvilinear relationship between diversification and firm performance (Palich et al. 2000) . Pennings et al. (1994) argue that diversification extends a firm's domain but entails risk and uncertainty. Andrews (1980) and Gluck (1985) point to diversification as a means for the firm to expand from its core business into other product markets. Carrera et al. (2003) identify several factors that can affect an audit firm to diversify: diversification of litigation risk (Jones and Raghunandan 1998); saturation of existing markets and search of new clients (Peel 1997); economies of scale and reduced cost of entrance (Boone et al. 2000) ; and division of audit firms into audit and consultancy businesses (Carrera et al. 2003) .
When the firm operates in a set of related businesses, it can exploit its 'core factors' leading to economies of scope and experience (Palepu 1985) . Economies of scope is achieved by using the same resources, such as, information technology systems, finance, human resources management systems, marketing, and logistics across diverse markets and products (Etgar and Rachman-Moore 2010) . Economies of experience arise when firms learn how to benefit from coordination of resource flow across diverse markets (Kogut 1985) . On the other hand, unrelated diversification provides few operating synergies (Palepu 1985) and can be detrimental to performance. Firms pursuing related diversification have been shown to outperform unrelated diversification (Jacqemin and Berry 1979; Palepu 1985; Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988) . To the extent that audit offices are profit maximizing entities, managed by rational individuals, the findings of research literature in industrial organization and strategic management related to diversification should be applicable to them.
Another stream of auditing research examines the effect of audit office size on audit quality. Francis and Yu (2009) argue that larger offices have more "in-house" expertise and collective human capital. A larger audit office has more engagement hours. This provides better opportunities to the auditors to gain expertise in detecting material problems in the financial statements of clients. According to Francis and Yu (2009) , larger offices are more likely to detect and report material problems in the financial statements and are also more likely to require clients to correct the statements before being issued. They conclude that larger audit offices provide better audit quality to their clients. Along similar lines, Choi et al. (2010) reason that large (small) local offices are less (more) likely to be economically dependent on a particular client and are, therefore, less (more) likely to acquiesce to pressures from this client. They conclude that audit quality of large (small) audit offices is higher (lower). More recently, Francis et al. (2012) report that Big 4 office size is associated with fewer client restatements, and conclude that bigger offices have higher audit quality. audit office size and diversification and the first hypothesis can be written in alternate form as.
H1a: Ceteris paribus, diversification at the audit office level leads to client and sales expansion
Next, the paper examines two forms of diversification at the audit office level, mainly, market diversification and product diversification.
Market Diversification
The audit office can achieve market diversification by choosing clients in multiple industries, choosing diverse clients within an industry, and by choosing clients within an industry that are geographically dispersed. These forms of diversification are discussed below.
Industry Diversification
Given limited resources, audit offices that are more diversified across industries sacrifice the advantage of industry specialization. Industry specialization has been shown to improve audit quality (Carcello and Nagy 2002; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Dunn and Mayhew 2004; Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010) 2 . For a given office, if it services more industries it will have fewer resources per industry. This might make it more challenging for the office to achieve expertise in a particular industry. In other words, the office may spread its resources too 'thin' across more industries, sacrificing depth for width. Based on extant literature, one should expect industry diversification to be detrimental to audit quality. This leads to my second hypothesis in alternate from. 
Geographic Diversification
Audit offices can focus on local clients in the same city or diversify to more distantly located clients. Local auditors have superior knowledge and are in a better position to get information about their clients (Francis et al. 1999) ; can visit clients and talk to employees and suppliers more frequently; and have better understanding of local businesses and market conditions (Choi et al. 2008) . Choi et al. (2008) shows that the auditor-client distance adversely affects audit quality. Prior research also shows that the SEC is able to monitor the firm's behavior better as the geographic distance between the firm and the SEC decreases (Kedia and H4a: Ceteris paribus, audit quality will be negatively associated with diversification to distantly located clients.
Product Diversification
In addition to market diversification, the audit office can diversify by offering multiple services other than auditing to the same client, such as, tax compliance and planning, auditing employee benefit plans, acquisition related consultancy services, internal control reviews, and attest services. Provision of multiple services to the same client can lead to impairment of auditor independence and, as a result, to reduced audit quality. On the other hand, knowledge gained from providing other services to the client can result in knowledge spillover and, thereby, lead to improved audit quality. Prior research provides limited evidence of independence impairment due to provision of non-audit services (Frankel et al. 2002; Defond Et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Antle et al. 2006; Ruddock et al. 2006; Hope and Langli 2010) .
According to Gleason and Mills (2011) , prior research finds little evidence that non-audit services are associated with impaired auditor independence. On the contrary, Kinney et al. (2004) and Gleason and Mills (2011) find that provision of non-audit services improves quality of earnings reporting, implying higher audit quality. More specifically, they show that auditor provided tax services (ATS) improve the estimate of tax reserves and conclude that their results are consistent with knowledge spillover. Based on the above reasoning, the fourth hypothesis can be written in alternate form as:
H5a: Ceteris paribus, audit quality will be positively associated with diversification across services provided by the audit office.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN

Measurement of Audit Quality
Consistent with extant research ( Where IBC is the income before extraordinary items (Compustat cash flow item), OANCF is net cash flow from operating activities, and AT is total assets. The model to estimate discretionary accruals is:
Where Lag(AT) is total assets of prior year; ∆SALE is change in revenue; RECCH is the decrease in accounts receivables ; PPEGT is property plant and equipment (gross total); and ROA is return on assets, calculated as IBC deflated by AT. Equation 1 is estimated by year for each industry (2-digit SIC code). Then, TACC minus the predicted value from the above regression is my measure of discretionary accruals (DACC).
The last measure of audit quality is the propensity to meet-or-beat earnings expectations, MBEX. This variable is defined as a dichotomous variable with value of one if the firm meets or beats the earnings expectation (proxied by the most recent median consensus analysts' forecast available on IBES file) by one cent; and zero otherwise.
Measurement of Audit Office Diversification
Jacquemin and Berry (1979 ), Palepu (1985 , and Robins and Wiersema (2003) define diversification with an entropy measure DT (total diversification) as follows.
Where P i is market share of the i th industry segment in the total revenue of the audit office. Robins and Wiersema (2003) show that under the assumption that all business in a portfolio are approximately the same size, equation 2 can be simplified to. [insert Table 1 
Where, F{*} represents the logistic cumulative probability distribution function. Models (4) and (5) are based on prior research, as explained below. LMV is computed as the natural logarithm of the client's market value at the close of fiscal year. LMV controls for any sizerelated effects. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) , Butler et al. (2004) , Geiger and North (2006) , and Asthana and Boone (2012) show that size is negatively associated with DACC and MBEX.
Earnings quality may be affected as a result of financing activities or acquisition proceedings (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003) . FINANCED is defined as 1 if the number of outstanding shares increases by at least 10% or long-term debt increases by 20% (following 
IV. SAMPLE
Sample Selection
The sample selection procedure is outlined in [insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 contains the variable distribution. The average market value of sample firms is $5.82 billion and the auditor charges a mean audit fees of $2.31 million. A typical audit office has 12 clients from 7 industries and earns over $32 million in revenue every year. Mean DACC is -0.0023 and almost 11% of firms just meet or beat earnings expectations (MBEX = 0.1062).
Sample Characteristics
On average, fewer than 19% firms were involved in acquisitions; had annual returns under 5%;
and were audited by big-N auditors in 85% of cases. 32% clients were involved in financing activities. ROA was barely above zero (0.0087); 24% firms had losses in current or previous year; almost 48% firms had qualified opinions; and 8% clients switched auditors. Finally, almost 33% of clients have been with their auditors for five years or less.
[insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 reports the correlation analysis between three proxies of office size, logarithm of total number of clients, logarithm of total assets of clients (in $ million) and logarithm of total office revenue, with the four measures of diversification, INDUSTRY_DIV, CLIENT_DIV, GEOG-DIV, and SERVICE_DIV. All correlations are significant at 1% level and range in values from 2.62% to 91.78%. This supports the hypothesis that diversification at the audit office level leads to client and sales expansion (H1a).
V. RESULTS
[insert Table 4 about here]
The results of our multivariate analysis (models 4 and 5) are reported in Table 5 ( [insert Lastly, given that there is a significant association between office size and diversification (Table 4) , one concern could be that in Models 4-5, the test variables, INDUSTRY_DIV, CLIENT_DIV, GEOG-DIV, and SERVICE_DIV are picking up engagement office size effects, despite the control variable, LOFFICE. This would result in model misspecification and unreliable test statistics. To allay this fear, the paper conducts portfolio tests. One-hundred portfolios are formed based on LOFFICE. Models 4-5 are now run on each of the portfolios independently. The distribution of the coefficients on the four test variables are presented in Table 6 . Since office size is mostly controlled for within each portfolio, the test variables are not likely to pick up any size-related effects. Overall, the results are consistent with multivariate regressions in Table 5 and support H2a-H5a.
[insert Table 6 about here]
Additional Tests
Is there a Pecking Order?
I also conduct tests to examine the pecking order of different strategies of diversification available to managers. Since the four measures of diversification used in the paper are measured on different scales, their coefficients are not comparable. To facilitate comparison, I convert these four variables to a (0, 1) scale as follows. INDUSTRY_DIV, CLIENT_DIV, GEOG_DIV, and SERVICE_DIV are ordered one-by-one from lowest to highest values and assigned ranks.
The ranks are then deflated by the highest rank to get a variable distribution between 0 and 1.
First, the various proxies of office size discussed in Table 4 (Insert Table 7 about here)
Next, the regressions in Table 5 , panels A-B are rerun with the four standardized measures of diversification (see Panel B of Table 7 ). Overall, the same pecking order emerges,
INDUSTRY_DIV > CLIENT_DIV > GEOG_DIV > SERVICE_DIV. This implies that
INDUSTRY_DIV has the most detrimental effect on audit quality and SERVICE_DIV has the least effect.
Does Local Reputational Capital Matter?
If an audit office has gained reputation in the local audit market, it will make extra efforts to minimize the detrimental effect of diversification on audit quality in order to retain its reputation and the quasi rents (reputation premium) it earns from the clients. To conduct this test, suggesting that there is still residual adverse effect on audit quality.
(Insert Table 8 about here)
Does the Level of Past Diversification Matter?
Finally, consider two offices "A" and "B" with the same levels of current diversification.
Office "A" was more diversified in the past and has reduced its level of diversification to get to today's level. Office "B" has done the opposite and increased diversification to attain the current level. I posit that since diversification consumes resources, office "A" will have surplus resources and diversification-related expertise and will be able to provide better quality audits compared to office "B" which has diversified from the past level and has a strain on its resources. To test this notion, I define a variable ∆INDEX which is the current value at time "t" minus the lagged value at time "t-5". ∆INDEX has significantly positive coefficient for the DACC regression (see Column V of Table 8 ). This suggests that office "A" will have higher audit quality than "B" as expected as postulated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Francis and Yu (2009) and Choi et al. (2010) present evidence that audit office size and audit quality are positively associated. Palepu (1985) suggests that firms diversify with the intention of revenue maximization. Thus, large audit offices are likely to be more diversified.
According to strategic management theory, diversification could have positive or negative impact on the product or service quality, depending on the nature of diversification. Following this stream of reasoning, the interrelationship of diversification, audit office size, and audit quality is an interesting yet unexplored research issue.
The paper examines the impact of four different diversification strategies: industry diversification, client diversification, geographic diversification, and service diversification on two proxies of audit quality, mainly, discretionary accruals and propensity to meet-or-beat earnings expectations by a cent. Using over 19,000 observations for over 3,000 unique clients for the period 2000-2009, the analyses show that, after controlling for office and client attributes, industry diversification, client diversification, and geographic diversification have adverse effects on audit quality, possibly because such diverse audit engagements strain the resources of the audit office. On the other hand, service diversification has beneficial effect on audit quality, possibly due to knowledge spill-over effect from providing multiple services to the same client, such as, tax compliance and planning, auditing employee benefit plans, acquisition related consultancy services, internal control reviews, and attest services. These results are robust to various controls from extant research.
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The pecking order of the four strategies of diversification on office size and audit quality is also examined. The diversification strategy that is most (least) effective in expanding the office size is also the one that has the most (least) adverse effect on audit quality. Also, the audit offices that have more stakes (reputational capital) in the local market manage the additional demands on resources due to diversification more efficiently with less adverse effect on audit quality. Finally, consistent with theory, I show that increase (decrease) in diversification levels over time has negative (positive) impact on audit quality.
The findings of this paper are important since they identify additional factors that explain audit quality at the audit office level and extend the recent research on audit office performance in the local audit market. As a consequence of these results, future researchers are advised to control for diversification at the audit office level, in addition to controls for office attributes suggested by extant research. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) , deflated by total assets for each 2-digit SIC code by year. We use the difference between net income and cash from operations as our measure of total accruals ( See Table 1 for variable definitions. Control variables are included in the regressions but not reported for the sake of brevity. 100 portfolios are formed on audit office-size (LOFFICE). 5% extreme estimates are eliminated from calculations. *** implies significance at 1% level (2-sided) ** implies significance at 5% level (2-sided) * implies significance at 10% level (2-sided) 
